Are there any parameters imposed upon the interpretation of Torah, or is it a free-for-all?
Many find it strange that passages in the Torah that Chazal once took literally are being read by moderns in less and less literal ways. Yet, these very same moderns are unwilling to question the authority of the Rabbis when it comes to halachic matters. On the surface this appears to be hypocritical on their part – either the viewpoints of the Rabbis should be treated as sacrosanct, or we should be able to challenge them across the board!
Furthermore, the very basis of our acceptance of the Torah is our reliance upon tradition. Once we begin to undermine the infallibility of Chazal with respect to the explanation of the Torah’s text, isn’t the tradition as a whole placed on shaky foundations?
In order to address these difficulties, we must first distinguish between matters of halacha and non-normative matters. The field of halacha is an autonomous, rigorous discipline that has its own methodology and is grounded in unique, indigenous legal principles that were received at Sinai. Halachic “science” was intended to be a living tradition of research and analysis. Rabbis formulate theories, test hypotheses, and seek to develop the most elegant understanding of the structure of each mitsvah and its relationship to the halachic system as a whole.
The process of in-depth Torah study is, then, not unlike scientific investigation, in the sense that it demands the use of abstract reasoning combined with careful attention to the nuances of “empirical” data. Where it parts ways with the physical sciences is in the source of the material it works with. The data that scientists analyze is primarily derived from sense perception and observation. By contrast, the “data” of the halachic system are received through tradition. Aside from this important difference, though, the standards employed in halachic research are quite similar to those enshrined in fields of scientific inquiry. Just as the validity of a theoretical construct in the sciences is dependent upon its compatability with all of the empirical evidence available, so too an halachic formulation’s validity is contingent upon its compatability with all of the facts provided by the Oral Torah.
The primary function of the Baale Hamesora (Masters of the Tradition), then, is to interpret and transmit the factual information of the Oral Torah faithfully. In the process, the Rabbis develop a comprehensive vision of how the various laws and principles interrelate harmoniously, and apply the law to new cases according to this paradigm.
Sometimes the theoretical perspectives of some Rabbis may diverge from that of their colleagues or from the positions held in generations past. On the surface, this appears problematic. Doesn’t difference of opinion undermine the sanctity and reliability of tradition? The reality is, though, that the Rabbis never act as mavericks, casting aside precedent and injecting their own innovative ideas into the realm of halachic discourse. Like scientific researchers who are accountable to the empirical data before them, the Rabbis remain beholden to the parameters of the halachic system and must exercise their creativity within that framework. As long as they abide by this basic rule, their theoretical formulations, and halachic decisions, retain their legitimacy and holiness.
When it comes to non-halachic aspects of Torah, on the other hand, a Rabbi is entitled to exercise almost unbridled creativity. He need not feel constrained by the teachings of tradition, because there is no formal tradition with regard to the interpretation of such passages. Since the explanation of the narrative portions of Scripture is not formulated as a rigorous, internally consistent “science” like halacha, there is much more leeway to be found in this area of study. We see evidence of this fact in the Midrashic literature, wherein the divergence of Rabbinic opinion is far more pronounced than in the Talmud.
Outside of the realm of halachic analysis, then, a scholar is permitted – and even encouraged – to develop an independent understanding of the Torah that appeals to his or her intellect. This allows our appreciation of the philosophical wisdom and subtlety of the Torah to grow continuously, generation after generation. Rather than compromising the tradition, this built-in flexibility guarantees the Torah’s eternal relevance to our lives.
Great description of the halachik system. I would add however that Rambam’s view is to interject hashkafic thinking into halacha and has developed a system where the two are interdependent. It is not so with all other Rishonim though I find several Rambans and especially Rashbah’s who go in the same direction. Acharonim, though I am no great expert and have not learned much of their works, the little I know of them seem to not follow that approach.
I agree with you regarding Rambam, Rashba and Ramban. It is clear that the Ralbag also adopted this approach. Among Kabbalists, this kind of thinking is the rule rather than the exception; but their whole conceptual framework is different from the one we are speaking about here. In more recent times, Rav Hirsch certainly attempted to present philosophy and halacha as an integrated system. I too am not the greatest expert in Acharonim, but I have seen hints of this vision in some of their writings, albeit in a less developed form.
Concerning your last two paragraphs – I think some people might misunderstand what you are saying. Many people take the idea that you are expressing to an extreme and believe “appeals to … intellect” means they can put forward whatever philosophical theory they fancy (and start messing around with y’sodei hadat). This is clearly impossible. The biggest problem is not with philosophical creativity but with people who think they are philosophers. (ואינו יודע המידות שידון בהן עד שיידע האמת על בורייו, ונמצא יוצא לידי מינות.)
The only limitation on interpretation is reason. However, this requires reasonable people.
Yesterday I came across a great post from “On the Main Line” about Shadal’s 10 principles for commenting on Tanakh – which I believe is highly relevant. When you click on the stars the original text comes up.
>Like scientific researchers who are accountable to the empirical data before them, the Rabbis remain beholden to the parameters of the halachic system and must exercise their creativity within that framework. As long as they abide by this basic rule, their theoretical formulations, and halachic decisions, retain their legitimacy and holiness.
Here the analogy breaks down. Science is bound by the empirical data of previous generations, but is free to discard their theories and conclusions if new data that indicates a different explanation for the old data comes to light. Halacha on the other hand is bound by the legal decisions of prior generations. This difference is accentuated by the principle of Ain Bais Din Yochol Levatel Divrei Bais Din Chaveiro Elu Im Cain Godol Haimenu Bechachma Uvemniyan. Thus, the status of an animal as a treifa is determined using the medical knowledge of ancient Babylonia and other rules are derived from the placement of vowels in the text (which was originally written in an alphabet that didn’t even have vowels). My point here is not to criticize the system, but rather your comparison to science, in which falsifiability is an essential and permanent requirement for every claim. Halacha is just a legal system and like every legal system in history it seeks to balance reason with precedent. Unlike more modern legal systems, however, precedent rarely gives way to reason.
Mikeskeptic
Mike, your description is not entirely correct. First of all, as the Rambam explains at length in Sefer Shoftim, the Bet Din of every generation is authorized to reinterpret the data and develop their own understanding of it, even if that Bet Din is inferior to previous ones.
Otherwise, the Torah Shebal Peh would not be the living intellectual tradition it is supposed to be – it would become disconnected from the learning process of the scholars themselves, and would be reduced to dogma. The Oral Torah must remain an authentic expression of the theoretical understanding of the Baale Hamesorah of every generation.
The only time that the principle of “En Bet Din Yachol L’vatel” applies is in the case of Rabbinic legislation, i.e., decrees and institutions promulgated by the Rabbis themselves. In this case, because the legislation in question is a reflection of the rabbis who established it, it cannot be overturned by later Rabbis unless they are superior.
You are right that some of the specific conclusions of normative halacha are “frozen in time” and are based upon ancient science. This is a result of the fact that the Oral Torah is no longer oral. We are therefore required to abide by the writings of the last genuine Baale Hamesorah, the Talmudic Rabbis.
Although the principles of Torah are eternal, the way in which they are applied to the facts is subject to change based upon advances in empirical knowledge. In the future, when the Bet Din Hagadol is reestablished and the living tradition of Oral Torah is resurrected, the halacha will of course rule differently in these cases.
R. Maroof, I still don’t see it. You basically explain that there is a difference beween the Narrative and Halachik systems without proving that it is intended to be that way by God.
>We see evidence of this fact in the Midrashic literature, wherein the divergence of Rabbinic opinion is far more pronounced than in the Talmud.
On the contrary, the fact that the divergence of opinion is not as pronounced in the Talmud, might work against you. Perhaps, the Talmud, by not adopting the Midrashic philosophy is in essence rejecting it.
>Mike, your description is not entirely correct. First of all, as the Rambam explains at length in Sefer Shoftim, the Bet Din of every generation is authorized to reinterpret the data and develop their own understanding of it, even if that Bet Din is inferior to previous ones.
Can you provide an example? Can we rework laws of Aguna?
BHB,
We can’t assume that the Midrash and the Talmud have an argument that basic about methodology, because the very same Rabbis are represented in each genre They would have to be arguing with themselves! That is the proof that this is how the mesorah was always understood.
Regarding Agunot, this is not the type of thing that can be reworked. The fundamental structure of a mitsvah, including the basic explanations of normative verses in the Torah and the principles of their application, are the building blocks of the system. It is in the realm of theory that reworking can take place.
As an example off the top of my head, we find a machloqet in the Gemara in Makkot as to whether Shemitta cancels a loan that is not yet up for collection in Shemitta year.
From a theoretical point of view, the question being discussed is simple. One side (let’s say X)maintains that Shemitta cancels loans by eliminating the obligation of the debtor. This can take effect even if the loan is not yet due.
The other side (let’s say Y) holds that Shemitta works by eliminating the creditor’s right to collect. This could only operate if the loan were already due, since before that time the creditor has no such right.
Now, the Rabbis who debate this question may agree on all other facts about Shemitta, and they certainly agree about the basic structure of the institution of Shemitta. Yet they differ in how they explain its mechanism from a theoretical standpoint. Each Rabbi will view all of the halachot from his particular paradigm, and each Rabbi finds that all of the halachot are compatible with his conception of how Shemitta functions. The only case in which the theories yield different results is the one discussed in the Gemara.
Now, even if all previous Batei Din had interpreted the halacha of Shemitta according to principle X, a later Bet Din would have the right to construe the laws of Shemitta in light of principle Y, and to rule accordingly.
In this way, the theoretical plane of halachic discourse retains its fluidity and vibrance, while the essential structure of the halachic system remains intact.
Many practical issues that have come up of late (e.g. boycotting airlines, books, grocery stores) seem to depend more on one’s philosophical outlook and public policy than strict interpretation of halachic data. Yet, many people claim that the decisions of ‘gedolim’ on these issues carry the same weight as halachic pronouncements and one has no right to disagree. Do you place these type public policy issues or other issues that call on a posek to ‘read between the lines’ in the realm of pure halacha or in the realm of philosophy, and to what degree is one entitles to an independent view in these areas?
>Otherwise, the Torah Shebal Peh would not be the living intellectual tradition it is supposed to be – it would become disconnected from the learning process of the scholars themselves, and would be reduced to dogma. The Oral Torah must remain an authentic expression of the theoretical understanding of the Baale Hamesorah of every generation.
That is a fine description of what an ideal legal system should look like and it fairly describes many modern Western legal systems. But applying it to halacha strikes me as involving at least a little bit of wishful thinking. The Aguna example proposed by BHB is a good one, as is your shemitta example. In both cases, what we find is that once a consensus develops on a rule and the consensus remains unchallenged for a sufficient number of generations it develops into a precedent that future generations remain powerless to change. At best, they can use reason to determine the appropriate scope of the rule in applying it to situations that were not addressed by prior generations or on which no consensus had developed. Thus, we find that when someone points out that certain chumras can result in “halachic infertility,” not a single leading posek is willing rethink the rule in light of the data. (I’m not even arguing that the rule really doesn’t work anymore, as I’m neither a doctor nor a posek, I’m just making the obvious point that our gedolim feel bound by the precedent and refuse even to undertake a fresh analysis.)
I think the conclusion is inescapable that, while halacha and science are both intellectually challenging, they are not equally alive and connected to modern scholarship.
Mikeskeptic
Mike, I don’t disagree with you that halacha is no longer “alive” to the extent that it should be. What I am arguing is that this is the unfortunate result of the disintegration of the oral mesorah and its fossilization in the text of the Talmud. Because we no longer have genuine Baale Mesora who can deviate from precedent in any substantial way, we are bound to abide by the consensus handed down to us in the Gemara. Ultimately, however, when the Bet Din Hagadol is reconstituted, this will change.
The Aguna example is not ideal because most of the proposed solutions to the Aguna problem involve violations of essential principles of the halachic system, and are not really valid interpretations of the fundamental source material.
The only legitimate approach I know of would be to follow the Rambam’s view and compel recalcitrant husbands to grant divorces. This is something a bona fide Bet Din would in theory be able to do.
Chaim, your question is a complex one…I believe every situation must be evalutated independently. It is hard to cover them all with a single brushstroke.
In some cases, there are legitimate halachic concerns at play. In others, political factors are prominent. In still others, the decrees of the gedolim function to reinforce certain elements of their ideology rather than address any halachic concern. In the majority of cases, an interplay of these elements is at work, and one must be careful to tease out and evaluate each one of them.
On one hand, there is an extent to which we should defer to our teachers on matters of philosophy and public policy, especially if there are practical implications to their views. For this reason, I don’t look down on people who abide by the guidelines and pronouncements of their Rabbanim with reference to such issues, even if my own perspective on those issues is different. I understand that the followers of a Rav respect his judgment as a general rule, and not just when it comes to halachic decisions.
On the other hand, in matters of pure theology and philosophy, a qualified person should feel free to explore the traditional sources on his own terms, provided he has the requisite training and background to study them properly.